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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the military in law enforcement, both domestically
and internationally, has been praised and decried from both ends of
the political spectrum. It has been written about in countless articles,
from serious academic journals' to sensationalistic popular magazines.2
Organizations, depending on their political viewpoints, voice grave
concern or trumpet strong support over such efforts from websites
across the Internet.3 The military's engagement in civilian law en-
* Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard Reserve; Staff Attorney, Office of
Legislation, Coast Guard Headquarters; Admitted Texas State Bar, 1999; Juris Doctor, magna
cum laude, Seattle University School of Law, 1999; Master of Business Administration,
Washington State University, 1989; Bachelor of Arts, University of Washington, 1987. The
opinions contained herein are solely those of the author and are not to be construed as those of
the United States Coast Guard or any other agency of the United States government.
1. See, e.g., Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within the
Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 HOuS. L. REV. 1421 (2000).
2. See, e.g., James L. Pate, The FBI's New HR-Soldiers or Policemen? Black Suits, Badges
and Bradleys, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, August 1996, at 56. This article represents a right-wing,
almost militia-esque view of posse comitatus, and relies on unnamed sources as well as cites to"classified portions" of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (of which only the executive
summary is unclassified and available to the public) of the Clinton Administration that purport-
edly "exempts" portions of the military from the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). PDD-25 deals
with the reform of multinational peacekeeping organizations, not the use of the United States
military in law enforcement, and it is dubious whether an executive order can override a duly
enacted congressional statute. The best that can be said of this type of article is that it repre-
sents, and reinforces, the opinions and beliefs of those who already are deeply suspicious of any
activity by any organization of the federal government.
3. See, e.g., Border Action Network, at http://www.borderaction.org/home.html (last vis-
ited May 18, 2003) (formerly known as SWARM, Southwest Alliance to Resist Militarization).
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forcement, and the law surrounding this engagement, has been fodder
for an innumerable number of dissertations, articles, and theses.4 In
addition, it has been a frequent topic of discussion within the military
itself.' Since 1990, there have been no less than thirteen articles pub-
lished in The Army Lawyer, which is a publication of the Judge Advo-
cate General's School of the United States Army.6
It is likely that this interest in the use of the military in law en-
forcement, along with the topic of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA),
The Border Action Network is an organization that, in its own words, "consists of activists and
organizers from the environmental, human rights, labor, and social justice movements who came
together to oppose military and Border Patrol expansions on the border and to hold them ac-
countable to the public. We see ourselves as a 'new generation' of activists who believe in the
importance of multi-issue organizing and coalition building." Id.
4. The following is a list of various articles written on posse comitatus and the use of mili-
tary personnel and assets in law enforcement: Matthew Carlton Hammond, The Posse Comitatus
Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953 (1997); Jonathan W. Hitesman,
Note, Fighting in Another Direction: The Posse Comitatus Act and the War on Drugs in Hawai'i
Under State v. Pattioay, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 835 (1996); David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman,
Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law En-
forcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619 (1997); Colonel Paul Jackson Rice, New Laws and Insights
Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, 104 MIL. L. REV. 109 (1984); Roger Blake Hohnsbeen, Note,
Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law En-
forcement, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404 (1986); Christopher A. Abel, Not Fit For Sea Duty: The
Posse Comitatus Act, The United States Navy, and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 445 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of
Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1994). Colonel Dunlap
takes, in his own words, "a less optimistic view" of the possibility of lessening civilian control
over the military. Id. at 341.
6. Army Lawyer articles and practice notes in the 1990s that deal with the Posse Comitatus
Act (PCA) to a significant degree: Lt. Commander W. Kent Davis, USN, Innovative Readiness
Training Under 10 U.S. C. § 2012: Understanding the Congressional Model for Civil-Military Pro-
jects, 2001-JUL ARMY LAW. 21 (2001); Lt. Colonel W. A. Stafford, USMC, How to Keep Mili-
tary Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: Jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of
Deadly Force, 2000-NOV ARMY LAW. 1 (2000); Commander Jim Winthrop, USN, The Okla-
homa City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority
(MACA), 1997-JUL ARMY LAW. 3 (1997); Faculty, The Judge Advocate General's School,
TJAGSA Practice Note: International and Operational Law Notes, 1995-JUL ARMY LAW. 60
(1995); Faculty, The Judge Advocate General's School, TJAGSA Practice Note: International and
Operational Law Notes 1995-DEC ARMY LAW. 62 (1995); Lt. Colonel Steven B. Rich, The Na-
tional Guard, Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, and Posse Comitatus: The Meaning and
Implications of 'In Federal Service,' 1994-JUN ARMY LAW. 35 (1994); Captain Robert C. Glea-
son, CLAIMS REPORT: The Use of National Guard Personnel for Counter-Drug Operations: Im-
plications Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1991-JUN ARMY LAW. 47 (1991); Leroy C. Bry-
ant, The Posse Comitatus Act, the Military, and Drug Interdiction: Just How Far Can We Go?
1990-DEC ARMY LAW. 3 (1990); L. Dow Davis, USNR, Reserve Callup Authorities: Time for
Recall? 1990-APR ARMY LAW. 4 (1990); Stephen Nypaver III, CID and the Judge Advocate in
the Field-A Primer, 1990-SEP ARMY LAW. 4 (1990); Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proceedings of the First
Center For Law and Military Operations Symposium 18-20 April 1990,1990-DEC ARMY LAW. 47
(1990).
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stems from traditional American antimilitarism.7 This antimilitarism
grew out of the experiences of the rebellious royal subjects who led the
nation to independence. Some argue that antimilitarism has changed
to "postmodern militarism," as described by Colonel Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., USAF.8 This change in America's attitudes came about
as the problems faced by the country grew in complexity and danger.
Civilian law enforcement agencies were perceived to be unable to han-
dle the increasing threat from narcotics smuggling, illegal immigra-
tion, and terrorism. As a result, Colonel Dunlap argues, the mood of
antimilitarism changed to one of a belief that the military services, as
results-oriented "can do" organizations, were naturally the best suited
to handle these intractable problems.9 And so the military was given
extensive missions in all kinds of traditionally civilian areas, from dis-
aster relief, to anti-drug smuggling, to domestic counterterrorism op-
erations. This trend continues, as can be seen recently with the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) providing sophisticated intelligence
gathering aircraft to assist in the hunt for the Washington sniper in
the fall of 2002. Whether this is a wise policy choice or not depends
largely on one's political perspective. Certainly the questions spark
spirited debate.
The real issue that should be of concern to policymakers is not
whether the military's involvement in law enforcement can be recon-
ciled under both the PCA and our concept of civil liberties; that is
likely possible. The real concern with widening the military's partici-
pation in law enforcement (as well as other nontraditional military
missions) is not an erosion of civil liberties, but an erosion of military
capabilities.
This Article will first briefly discuss the Posse Comitatus Act
and its applicability in different situations, the exceptions to the PCA,
and the use of DOD military services in counter-drug operations.
Next, extraterritorial applications of the PCA will be briefly exam-
7. This antimilitarism was exemplified by the colonists' rage over the stationing of British
troops in the Colonies, ostensibly to keep the power of the King. This rage gave voice to the
Declaration of Independence, which, in clause 14, states, "He has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil power." The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen
Colonies, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, available at http://www.law.indiana.
edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
8. "[Plostmodem militarism is not marked by overt military dominance or even a societal
embrace of martial values. To the contrary, in the United States it arises in a citizenry which
largely embraces permissive individualism-hardly a military trait. Postmodern militarism ad-
mires the effectiveness of the military but rejects for civilian society the discipline and sacrifice
necessary to achieve it." Dunlap, supra note 5, at 387 (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 360-61.
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ined. Finally, the effects law enforcement activities may have on mili-
tary readiness will be discussed.
This Article does not claim to be exhaustive; its goal is simply to
put forward a thesis not often seen in legal periodicals. Nor does this
Article claim to have the definitive answer as to whether the use of
military forces in counter-drug operations, or law enforcement in gen-
eral, is a good or bad thing. In the end, the use of the military in law
enforcement is somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, there are
good points. For example, the military's logistical and power projec-
tion capabilities increase the reach of American law enforcement. On
the other hand, there are bad points. The military tends to think in
terms of "complete victory" over an opponent through the use of
overwhelming force, which may not be a useful mindset in law en-
forcement operations. Additionally, using military units for direct or
indirect law enforcement degrades those units' readiness for combat
operations.
The United States military is unlikely to become the tool of op-
pression feared by liberal legal scholars and pundits, but neither is it
likely to be the "always successful" organization that those on the
right think it is. The real threat posed by increasing military partici-
pation in law enforcement is that use of the military in law enforce-
ment operations will dull the critical war-fighting skills the military
services need. Fundamentally, the nation must think and choose
wisely, using the military in law enforcement judiciously, when its ca-
pabilities can be of most use, of greatest success, and complementary
to the skills the military needs to be effective in a modern combat en-
vironment.
II. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
The Posse Comitatus Act, which was enacted in 1878, is found
in Title 18 of the United States Code, Crimes and Criminal Proce-
dure. The text of the Posse Comitatus Act states as follows:
Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus.1° Whoever, ex-
cept in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of
the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
10. Black's Law Dictionary defines "posse comitatus" as follows: "Lat. The power or force
of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may
summon to his assistance in certain cases as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and ar-
resting felons, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (6th ed. 1990).
[Vol. 26:699
Military Involvement in Law Enforcement
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.11
The PCA is deceptive because, on its face, it is a proscriptive
law, creating criminal penalties for persons who use specific branches
of the military to enforce the laws of the United States. Yet it does not
appear that there have ever been any successful prosecutions for viola-
tions of the PCA. 2 In fact, the PCA has been used as a limit to the
military services themselves, not for individuals in the military or for
civilians in charge of the various military branches.
The black letter law of the PCA makes it applicable only to the
Army or the Air Force. This likely came about from the Act's origin
as a response to the use of the Army to enforce the law during Recon-
struction after the Civil War. To keep order at southern polling sta-
tions in the election of 1876, President Grant had Union troops man
the polls throughout the South. The Republican candidate, Ruther-
ford B. Hayes, was eventually declared the winner after much confu-
sion and dispute. Many southerners and Democrats believed that
these troops "stole" the election from the Democratic candidate, Sam-
uel J. Tilden,"a and helped to bring about passage of the Act. The Air
Force was added to the Act in 1947, when it was created out of the
former Army Air Forces. A technical amendment made most statutes
applicable to the Army also applicable to the Air Force. 4 Thus, it
does not appear that Congress gave conscious thought as to whether or
not the Air Force should specifically be covered by the PCA.
Because only the Army and Air Force are named in the text of
the Act, by the letter of the statute, the PCA does not apply to the
Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or National Guard when not op-
erating in federal status. As a result, no one could be charged with the
theoretical crime of using these branches of the military to execute
laws.1 (Since no one has evidently been prosecuted, it is highly
unlikely anyone ever would be.) Furthermore, while the Coast Guard
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2001).
12. See Hammond, supra note 4, at 961. Army officers were indicted in Texas in 1879, one
year after the PCA was enacted, for providing troops to a United States Marshall to enforce
revenue laws. It is not known whether or not these two Army officers were ever prosecuted. Id.
n.53.
13. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse Comitatus Act (18
USCS § 1385), And Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting Use of United States Army and Air
Force to Execute Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 271 (1997 & Supp. 2002).
14. In 1947, a separate Air Force was created. All laws pertaining to the Army, including
posse comitatus, were amended to include the Air Force. See United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d
372, 375 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
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may be transferred to the Department of the Navy as a result of a de-
clared war or by executive order,16 the PCA still would not apply to
the Coast Guard. 7
Some courts have interpreted the PCA as applicable to the other
branches (except the Coast Guard),' while other courts have found
that the PCA does not apply to the other branches. 9 Regardless, the
Department of Defense, the cabinet-level department of all the armed
services except the peacetime Coast Guard, has extended the restric-
tions of the PCA to its constituent services by regulation. 20
In the 1980s, Congress attempted to more clearly define what
roles the military could play in supporting civilian law enforcement
agencies. These changes were codified in Chapter 18 of Title 10,
United States Code, titled Military Support for Civilian Law Enforce-
ment Agencies.21 However, Congress stated in the legislative history
for Chapter 18 that these statutes were not additional restrictions on
the PCA, but rather that they were "clarifications" to the law, and in
no way increased any restrictions on the military's participation in law
enforcement activities. Regardless of this divergence of opinion, it is
clear that only the PCA has criminal penalties for its violation; 10
U.S.C. sections 371-382 and the DOD regulations do not.
As stated earlier, DOD policy made the provisions of the PCA
applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps.22 Nevertheless, the DOD
services can and do provide support to civilian law enforcement agen-
cies (LEAs), and thus, at least indirectly, engage in law enforcement.
The military may be indirectly involved with an LEA or provide as-
sistance to an LEA that is incidental to a military purpose. (For these
purposes, the Coast Guard is considered a taw enforcement agency de-
spite its being an armed military service.23) Furthermore, Congress,
16. Authority to transfer the Coast Guard to the Navy can be found at 14 U.S.C. § 3
(1990).
17. See SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION 5820.7 (series).
18. See, for example, the Ninth Circuit's decision that the PCA applies to the Navy
through 10 U.S.C. § 375 and 32 C.F.R. § 213.10 in United States v. Kahn, 35 F.3d 426, 431 (9th
Cir. 1994).
19. The D.C. Circuit wrote, "We cannot agree that Congress' words admit of any ambigu-
ity. By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 places no restrictions on naval participation in law enforce-
ment operations; an earlier version of the measure would have expressly extended the bill to the
Navy, but the final legislation was attached to an Army appropriations bill and its language was
accordingly limited to that service." United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
20. See generally 32 C.F.R. § 215.1-10 (2003).
21. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382 (2003).
22. See generally 32 C.F.R. § 215.1-10 (2003).
23. § 3.11.3.2 The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP I-
14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7.
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via statute, has defined certain functions as outside the scope of the
PCA, and such functions are therefore by definition "indirect" assis-
tance to law enforcement.24 One of these functions, and perhaps the
most controversial, is the authorization to allow the DOD, particularly
the Navy, to engage in "[i]nterception of vessels or aircraft detected
outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of commu-
nicating with such vessels and aircraft to direct such vessels and air-
craft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials. "21
The practice is most common when a Coast Guard Law En-
forcement Detachment (LEDET) is assigned to a United States Navy
ship. Statute determines when an LEDET should be assigned. 6
When the Navy ship with an LEDET on board begins a drug inter-
diction operation, it shifts tactical control (TACON) from the Navy to
the United States Coast Guard.
Tactical control is defined as "the temporary authority to direct
activities of a specific unit on a specific mission for a specific period of
time. This authority is assigned by the operational commander. The
organizational element with TACON of a unit is the tactical com-
mander of that unit. ' 28  Simply, what this means is that the Coast
Guard, not the Navy, directs the actions of the Navy ship. The Coast
Guard decides what targets to pursue, whether or not to seek permis-
sion to board a vessel, and what actions to take. If a foreign-flagged
vessel is to be boarded, the procedures in the Coast Guard Maritime
Law Enforcement Manual29 are followed. Permission to board a for-
eign-flagged vessel is obtained from its flag state by making a request
up the Coast Guard chain of command, and then, via the Department
of State, to the foreign flag state. The DOD does not control the proc-
ess nor can it direct the process.
24. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382 (2003).
25. 10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(2)(D) (2003).
26. 10 U.S.C. § 379 requires the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation
(now Secretary of Homeland Security) to assign Coast Guard LEDETs to every appropriate sur-
face naval vessel operating at sea "in a drug-interdiction area." A "drug- interdiction area" is an
area outside the land area of the United States in which the Secretary of Defense determines that
activities involving smuggling of drugs into the United States is ongoing. Id. Most commonly
these areas are the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of Central and South
America.
27. CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL SCHOOL OF THE ARMY, DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW (DOPLAW) HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 48 (2001).
28. United States Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, COMDTINST
M16247.1 (series), at Ch. II § E(1)(e).
29. Id.
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Nonetheless, this is perhaps the area where most opponents of
military law enforcement operations feel the PCA is being violated, if
not in the letter of the law, then in its spirit. Many authors feel that
this type of operation is in fact using the military directly in law en-
forcement. An oft-cited example is the 1983 interdiction of the vessel
RANGER by Coast Guard personnel assigned to the U.S.S. KIDD.
The First Circuit described the situation in United States v. Del
Prado-Montero° as follows:
On July 14, 1983, after making radar contact, Coast Guard offi-
cials aboard a U.S. Navy destroyer, the U.S.S. KIDD, sighted
the RANGER at twilight, noting that it was heading due west
toward both the Bahamas and the United States, that it carried 5
or 6 antennae (more than normal) and that it obviously carried
some cargo, the hull being down to the waterline. No name or
markings could be seen at the time. By radio the RANGER's
master responded to inquiries, saying that there was no cargo,
that the vessel was being delivered from Antigua to new owners
in Freeport in the Bahamas, and that there were no documents
aboard nor any main beam number discoverable. The master
also reported that the vessel was of Honduran registry. He first
gave 31483 as the registration number, then he gave 331483.
Neither number included the three letters traditionally denoting
Honduran registry. When asked why the vessel was northeast
of a normal course from Antigua to Freeport, he evidenced no
concern. He refused a consensual boarding, saying that the
RANGER had a faulty governor and could not start once it had
stopped.
Subsequently, the Coast Guard initiated a request through gov-
ernmental channels and ascertained, by 1:30 p.m. of the follow-
ing day, July 15, that the RANGER's registry had been "re-
futed" by Honduras. The KIDD, after ordering the RANGER
to stop twice and being twice refused, sounded General Quar-
ters. At 7:00 p.m., the Coast Guard ensign was raised on the
KIDD, signifying its Coast Guard control and mission. The
KIDD fired warning shots on both the evening of the 15th and
the morning of the 16th, and then resorted to firing disabling
shots, which finally brought the RANGER to a halt. Thereafter
the RANGER was boarded by a party headed by a Coast Guard
officer.
30. 740 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984).
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The observations made by the boarding party, as testified to by
Coast Guard witnesses, are relevant to and dispositive of the
challenge all defendants make to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Just before the boarding a person on board the RANGER was
seen shredding and throwing into the ocean a paper containing
what looked like the contour lines, longitude and latitude mark-
ings of a chart. The total crew consisted of nine and had been
on this voyage for 14 days. Only three or four would have been
required if there had been no need to unload cargo, i.e., if the
only obligation of the crew was to deliver the vessel to Freeport.
On boarding the RANGER, the Coast Guard personnel found
the odor of marijuana "very noticeable." In the middle and aft
holds, 881 bales of marijuana, weighing over 57,000 pounds,
were found. The middle hold was close to the crew's living area
and was covered only by wood planks. The aft hold was covered
by a heavy metal lid, which the crew refused to help the Coast
Guard open. A powdered milk container similar to others found
in the galley was found in the middle hold; a case of empty
Coca-Cola bottles similar to those found in the living quarters
was found in the aft hold. The main engine appeared to have
been tampered with.3
It is worth noting that the KIDD interdiction described above
occurred in 1983,32 before the rewriting of 10 USC section 375. (The
rewriting of this statute is discussed later in the Article.)
Those who consider the actions taken by the U.S.S. KIDD as de-
scribed in Del Prado-Montero to be a violation of the PCA often de-
scribe it as an example of direct law enforcement action by a prohib-
ited branch of the military.33 Opponents of using the military in law
enforcement activities often maintain that raising the Coast Guard en-
sign is merely a canard, an action of no significance that does nothing
to change the essential characteristic of the enforcement action as one
by the United States Navy.
These critics fail to grasp the inherent control of such operations
by the United States Coast Guard. This control extends beyond the
31. Id. at 114-15.
32. Id. at 114.
33. See, e.g., John P. Coffey, Note, The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic: War
on Drugs or Ambush on the Constitution? 75 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1961 (1987), where the author writes
as follows:
The scenario described... violates the proscriptions of the Posse Comitatus Act-at
least as evaluated by a standard of participation defined by one sister service. It also
appears to violate the 1981 Act's restriction on 'direct participation' in an interdiction
or search and seizure by a member of the Navy.
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Coast Guard Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Law Enforcement De-
tachment, who is often a junior officer such as an Ensign or Lieuten-
ant, Junior Grade. Neither the Coast Guard Officer-in-Charge nor
the Navy ship's commanding officer, who usually significantly out-
ranks the Coast Guard officer, could take these steps without author-
ity from the tactical commander of the operation, who would be the
Coast Guard admiral in charge of that particular area.34 The Navy
never acts alone in such scenarios; it always acts at the direction of the
Coast Guard. The Navy does not intercept the ship, the Coast Guard
does.
The Coast Guard ensign was designed to distinguish Revenue
cutters from Navy vessels.3" This allowed vessels, in the days before
effective sound communication between ships at sea, to recognize that
it was not a Navy ship seeking to approach. When a Navy ship raises
the Coast Guard ensign, it represents a fundamental change in control
of that warship. The Navy Captain cannot act with impunity. He be-
comes a support platform for the Coast Guard and follows the orders
of the Coast Guard, from the tactical commander through the
LEDET Officer-in-Charge.
As mentioned previously, in the 1980s Congress sought to more
clearly define what actions the military could take when assisting law
enforcement agencies. In 1988, as part of that effort, Congress clari-
fied the issue of whether or not the actions such as those of the U.S.S.
KIDD represented an interception by updating 10 USC section 375.
Pre-1988, the statute read this way:
The Secretary of Defense shall issue such regulations as may be
necessary to insure that the provision of any assistance (include
ing the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment
of any personnel) to any civilian law enforcement official under
this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a
member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in an
interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search and seizure, arrest, or
other similar activity unless participation in such activity by
such member is otherwise authorized by law. 6
In 1988, the law was revised to read as follows:
34. In the early to mid 1980s this would likely have been the Commander, Seventh Coast
Guard District.
35. The Revenue Cutter Service was a predecessor service of the Coast Guard. It merged
with the United States Lifesaving Service to form the Coast Guard in 1915.
36. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1982).
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The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary to ensure that the provision of any support (includ-
ing the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment
or detail of any personnel) to any civilian law enforcement offi-
cial under this chapter does not include or permit direct partici-
pation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine
Corps in a search and seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity
unless participation in such activity by such member is other-
wise authorized by law.37
Importantly, the 1988 revision left out interception of vessels.
Also, since the revision, courts have routinely ruled that Navy support
of interception of smuggling vessels is not a violation of the law.3"
Therefore, Congress and the judiciary have decided that, at least in
this situation, this is not a violation of the PCA. As a result of the en-
actment of Chapter 18, Title 10 of the United States Code, Congress
has largely determined the extent to which the armed forces may assist
law enforcement agencies. Statutorily, at least, assistance to a law en-
forcement agency is not the actual exercise of law enforcement powers.
Whether it is a good policy choice to use the United States Navy as a
platform for drug interdiction operations, or to use any other element
of the military in support of law enforcement missions, will be dis-
cussed later.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT
It may be apocryphal, but it is rumored that sometime in the past
a Coast Guard Admiral once said, "The Constitution does not go to
Sea." What he may have meant by that comment, if it was ever ut-
tered at all, is lost in the mists of time. Nevertheless, the one statutory
provision governing the potentiality of the military engaging in law
enforcement, the PCA, on its face makes no distinction between the
uses of the military in domestic versus extraterritorial law enforce-
ment.39 The issues involving whether or not United States criminal
laws in general have any proscriptive effect beyond the territory con-
trolled by the United States are well beyond the scope of this Article.
Basically, some are, and some are not. Assuming, arguendo, that at
least criminal provisions involving drug smuggling are effective extra-
territorially, the question then becomes whether or not the restrictions
37. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1988).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. de-
nied, 528 U.S. 842 (1999).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
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on the military's engagement in law enforcement end once the military
exits United States airspace or territorial seas.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") Office of Legal Counsel is-
sued an opinion in November 1989 stating its conclusion that the
Posse Comitatus Act does not apply outside the territory of the United
States.4" The DOJ arrived at this conclusion by examining the Con-
gressional debate over the statute, the text of the statute, and the his-
tory surrounding its passage in 1878.41 Further, the opinion consid-
ered the general presumption against extraterritorial application of
criminal statues,42 constitutional concerns (such as the prerogatives of
the President as Commander in Chief),43 court decisions, 44 subsequent
legislation (10 U.S.C. sections 371-382), 4' and the DOD regulations
implementing those statutes.46 The author of this opinion, William P.
Barr, later became Attorney General of the United States. 47 Undoubt-
edly, this reflects the seriousness with which the former administration
took the issue of extraterritorial application of the PCA.
This legal opinion is perhaps the most definitive policy docu-
ment regarding extraterritorial application of the PCA. It has been the
basis of the United States's use of the military outside the territory of
the United States, at least in limited scope, for the last decade and for
the last three administrations. No court opinions on point have been
found challenging the conclusion of the Attorney General's opinion.
Therefore, any advocate in favor of applying the PCA extraterritori-
ally faces a difficult challenge.
40. William P. Barr, Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act: The Posse Comitatus
Act does not apply outside the territory of the United States, in OPINIONS OF OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL, 13 Op. O.L.C. 321 (1989). Interestingly enough, although the opinion was written in
1989, it was not released to the public until 1992, three years later. The reasons for this delay are
unknown, and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. One could speculate and
come to all sorts of scenarios ranging from the straightforward (policymakers desiring to avoid
controversy) to the nefarious (policymakers wishing to expand military law enforcement activi-
ties). However, it can be argued that the delay likely resulted from executive as well as work-
product privilege concerns.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 329.
43. Id. at 332.
44. Id. at 334.
45. Id. at 337.
46. Id. at 342.
47. See http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ls/agbib2000.htm#agchart (listing Attorneys General)
(last modified May 25, 2001).
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IV. THE EFFECT ON MILITARY READINESS
"The sinews of war are not gold, but good soldiers." -Machiavelli
Politicians have enlisted the military in "the war on drugs," with
assurances that military readiness will not be affected.48 (Usually this
is a case of the politics of convenience. Politicians routinely promise a
course of action claiming that mutually exclusive goals can be
achieved.) Scholars have argued that, with the end of the Cold War,
"[a]s the military threat to the United States changes and defense re-
sources are reduced," the military should perform more than tradi-
tional war fighting, and provide a range of noncombat services at
home and abroad.49 In order to effectuate these policy objectives,
some have advocated a rethinking of the PCA and the limits that
should be placed on involvement of the military in law enforcement.
However, these scholars fail to recognize that there are real ef-
fects on the military's readiness and war-fighting capabilities from en-
gaging in direct or indirect law enforcement missions, as well as other
noncombat missions. In a report on the effects of noncombat missions
on military readiness, the GAO wrote, "[S]uch participation can...
degrade a unit's war-fighting capability. The extent of degradation
depends on a number of factors .... It can take up to 6 months for a
ground combat unit to recover from a peace operation and become
combat ready."" ° Even authors who have asserted that the military
can meet the demand for future nontraditional missions5 have recog-
nized that there would be serious difficulties with meeting these de-
mands, up to and including that the United States military may not be
immediately or fully available for major theater warfare. 2 However,
48. In a speech during her failed 2000 presidential bid, candidate Elizabeth Dole said,
(I]n addition to increasing funds, I will task the military to fully engage in the war on
drugs on land, at sea, and in the air .... As president, I will expand the role of the
military, including the National Guard in the War on Drugs in a manner that would
not detract from military readiness and would maintain the separation of military and
law enforcement. I will provide the National Guard the funding it needs to serve at
the forefront of this crusade.
Elizabeth Dole, Address on the War on Drugs at Borderfield State Park (Oct. 7, 1999), at
http://www.wage-slave.org/dolespeech.html (last visited May 18, 2003). In 2002, Senator
Elizabeth Dole was elected to the United States Senate for the state of North Carolina.
49. JOHN Y. SCHRADER, THE ARMY'S ROLE IN DOMESTIC DISASTER SUPPORT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF POLICY CHOICES iii (RAND 1993). Mr. Schrader was speaking primarily of
the U.S. Army when writing this comment.
50. GAO REP. NSIAD-96-14 at 2-3.
51. BRUCE R. PIRNIE & CORAZON M. FRANCISCO, ASSESSING REQUIREMENTS FOR
PEACEKEEPING, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DISASTER RELIEF 49 (RAND 1998).
52. Id. at 50.
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few who support or oppose this policy of nontraditional mission activ-
ity for the military would support having enough forces available to
conduct a major theater war and noncombat contingencies at the same
time; the costs would be extremely high. 3
Another problem that results from engaging in nontraditional
missions such as military support to law enforcement agencies is the
problem of the heavy reliance on National Guard and Reserve units,
not only for nontraditional missions, but also for combat. The mod-
ern American military relies on these types of units for operational
missions. After the Second World War, there was a conscious shift in
United States doctrine to turn over many support and combat units to
the National Guard and Reserve. This turnover allowed the United
States to focus its active duty forces primarily on combat units, while
keeping enough support units on active duty to begin initial combat
operations. The bulk of the support units would then come into the
operation as National Guard and Reserve components were called up
and mobilized. Whether this policy has been successful is a matter of
debate. A post-mobilization study of Reserve units after the Gulf
War showed deficiencies in general proficiency, maintenance, and
leadership. In fact, not a single Army Reserve armor or mechanized
infantry unit saw action. 4 Furthermore, many of these Reserve units
were combat units designated for "round out" of active duty units.
For example, an army division is traditionally composed of three bri-
gades. Under current United States doctrine, there are only enough
subunits to form two active duty brigades assigned to many divisions.
The third brigade needed to fully complete the division is composed
of Reserve or National Guard units.
This means that in order to engage in a major theater war, pro-
longed peace-keeping mission, or any other sustained operation, the
United States must rely on Reserves and the National Guard. But it is
precisely these units, especially the National Guard when it is not in a
federal status, that conduct the bulk of military support to civilian law
enforcement agencies. These units engage either directly or indirectly
in law enforcement. If the operations tempo of United States forces
continues to increase, as it has over the last decade, it will become in-
creasingly difficult to conduct multiple sustained operations.
This operating tempo is difficult for these forces to maintain and
is detrimental to units through increased retention problems of per-
53. Id. at 51.
54. DEP'T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR 559-60 (App. H) (1992).
[Vol. 26:699
Military Involvement in Law Enforcement
sonnel. People are not able to sustain the pace. They burn out and
leave the Reserves and National Guard. The combination of peace-
keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, combat in Af-
ghanistan, drug detection and interdiction operations in the Caribbean
and Eastern Pacific, not to mention a major theater war, 55 becomes an
ever-increasing and protracted burden on the men and women who
make up these Reserve and National Guard units. This burden may
result in increased retention problems for the National Guard and Re-
serve.56 These men and women are expected to give up their civilian
lives for weeks, months, and even years at a time so that their units
may be used for these missions. When the deployment is over, they
are then let go to return to their civilian lives. With this type of de-
ployment schedule, many Reservists and National Guardsmen may
find their "part-time soldiering" increasingly incompatible with a ci-
vilian career and life. They may choose to opt out, causing a retention
problem.
One suggested solution is to swap combat units for units more
suited for missions such as law enforcement or support of civil au-
thorities. However, it is highly unlikely that the DOD or its compo-
nent services would ever support such a move. This solution would
likely be highly unpopular, not to mention highly degrading to the
military readiness needed to engage in combat operations.5 7 For ex-
ample, military commanders are not likely to be in favor of replacing
light infantry units, such as airborne troops, or special forces groups,
which are immensely valuable to the military commander's perceived
primary mission of winning wars, with more law enforcement oriented
units. Law enforcement oriented units may have some utility in fight-
ing wars, but not as much as a unit that is solely dedicated to combat.
It would not be perceived as a fair trade in the best interests of the
country they have sworn to serve.
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING READINESS
When examining the effect of law enforcement activities on mili-
tary readiness, it is perhaps easiest to view the issues in terms of the
following three basic questions:5 8
55. At the time of the writing of this Article, the United States had yet to engage in combat
operations against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Hence, it is not discussed here, but note
that Reserve and National Guard units are involved in that campaign.
56. PIRNIE & FRANCISCO, supra note 51, at 54.
57. Id. at 85.
58. These three questions and their descriptions are taken from RICHARD K. BETTS,
MILITARY READINESS: CONCEPTS, CHOICES, CONSEQUENCES 33 (The Brookings Institution
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(1) Readiness for when? This is a timeframe measurement.
Now? Sooner? Later? Related to this is the question of what is the
proper size of the peacetime gap between actual and potential military
power.
(2) Readiness for what? The kind of mission determines the re-
quirement for the type of military forces needed. Elements of the mis-
sion include what adversaries will be faced, what conditions will be
encountered, and what strategy should be used.
(3) Readiness of what? What kinds of forces are needed? Small,
highly maneuverable but lightly armed forces? Or big units packing a
lot of fire power? An important issue with this question is that by
emphasizing one set of capabilities it detracts from another.
The first issue to be addressed is the impact of using the military
in law enforcement on the "readiness for when" question. Law en-
forcement missions increase the gap between actual and potential mili-
tary power. When military units engage in law enforcement or law
enforcement support, they are not engaged in the activities necessary
to support their primary combat-related missions: units are not train-
ing for combat or participating in live-fire or maneuver exercises. For
example, staring through binoculars across the Rio Grande looking for
drug "mules" does not enhance an infantry unit's critical war-fighting
skills. Engaging in noncombat missions distracts a unit that might
otherwise be available for training or for combat. The unit, and the
individual service members that make up the unit, must spend valu-
able time re-training and re-learning the conditions, the elements, and
the doctrine of war-fighting, because the skills required for combat
and law enforcement are very different.
There is some overlap in the skills required for combat and law
enforcement missions. However, a unit does not exercise all essential
combat skills while engaging in law enforcement activities. To illus-
trate, a naval vessel engaged in drug interdiction operations on the
high seas uses the skills needed to operate and navigate the vessel
while under way. But, in today's high-tech combat environment, that
ship's crew is not engaged in critical training using the highly complex
sensor and targeting systems needed for modern sea combat. Just as a
carpenter would not use a sledgehammer to pound in a penny nail, a
1995) (emphasis in original). For other interesting studies on military readiness, see RUSSELL
W. GLENN, MARCHING UNDER DARKENING SKIES: THE AMERICAN MILITARY AND THE
IMPENDING URBAN OPERATIONS THREAT: A STATUS CHECK (RAND 1999); MELVIN R.
LAIRD & LAWRENCE J. KORB, THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY READINESS (American Enterprise
Institute 1980). The study published by the RAND Corporation cited here and in other cita-
tions was prepared either for the United States Army or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
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ship's crew would not use modern advanced fire control systems de-
signed for fleet defense to track a drug smuggler in a "go fast" boat, or
use an F-16 to simply intercept a Cessna loaded with cocaine. All
three are examples of attempting to use the wrong tool for the job.
Engaging in noncombat missions takes time away from training and
exposure to circumstances that resemble combat as closely as possible.
Training is at the heart of readiness. During the Cold War,
United States troops trained far more than their Soviet counterparts.
The Soviets often diverted their troops to civilian functions. This re-
sulted in lower average readiness of Soviet forces when compared to
United States forces.59 It has been recognized for years that training is
perhaps the most critical aspect of readiness. Also widely recognized
is the need for there to always be a sufficient number of forces ready at
any given time, while at the same time having a sufficient number of
forces available for training. "With virtually no slack in the force
structure, U.S. readiness posture must be rebalanced across the force
every time some element of the force engages in even the least de-
manding tasks."6
Military involvement in law enforcement also affects the "readi-
ness for what" question. Again, the issue is that these are very differ-
ent missions with very different adversaries and goals. Modern com-
bat is very fast-paced: decisions are made quickly in the heat and
stress of a life-and-death struggle. Soldiers are highly trained to use
force in the furtherance of the mission. They are trained to respond
with force when facing an adversary because the adversary is likely to
do the same. Being under fire changes the landscape and changes the
stakes. However, the typical adversary in drug interdiction missions is
not usually trying to kill the members of an interdiction force. Thus,
in a drug interdiction scenario, the use of deadly force is rarely re-
quired. As a result, the thought processes military personnel use to
decide when to bring deadly force to bear are not exercised. Military
personnel have different approaches to tactical situations than what is
required in a law enforcement situation. The appropriate reaction in
an adversarial law enforcement situation is not necessarily the use of
deadly force; a more deliberative approach may be more appropriate.
Conversely, military personnel involved in a combat situation need to
quickly decide when deadly force should be used. Moving military
59. BETTS, supranote 58, at 151.
60. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS 29.
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personnel between these two situations may cause the soldier to mis-
read or misunderstand a situation and use the wrong kind of force.
Perhaps the impact of using the military in law enforcement be-
comes most apparent with the "of what" question. Law enforcement
missions emphasize the ability to loiter, concealment from the adver-
sary, detection of the adversary through the analysis of indicators and
warnings, and, finally, interception, all under strict constitutional and
legal guidelines. Modern combat emphasizes fast maneuver warfare,
using massive amounts of data for pinpoint targeting by highly tech-
nologically advanced weapons. To be successful under these condi-
tions, units need time to focus on training that is appropriate for the
expected mission. A light infantry unit must focus its training on ma-
neuver warfare, not arrest procedures and rules of evidence.
However, with limited training resources and commanders for
whom success during peacetime is measured by combat readiness,
there is a fundamental conflict. Commanders will protect, to the
greatest extent possible, time and funding from claimants that do not
directly contribute to combat readiness.6' The military law enforce-
ment mission is one of those claimants, and military commanders re-
sist giving precious training time to support it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Posse Comitatus Act is a useful prohibition on the use of the
military in law enforcement. It safeguards fundamental rights and lib-
erties that are at the core of our political and juridical philosophies.
The PCA reinforces the concept of civilian control of the military, but
it does not provide the bulwark against potential military oppression
that many feel it either does, or should. The true defense against mili-
tary tyranny and oppression rests in the hearts and minds of the mem-
bers of our armed forces and in our over two hundred year tradition of
civilian control of the military. It has been so ingrained within our
armed forces that it is highly unlikely that the military would let itself
become a force for oppression. Arguably, there are fewer controls and
protections when the military is used for extraterritorial law enforce-
ment where the PCA does not apply. In these situations, there still is
the protection of the innate character of military service members to
follow civilian control. This protection is further enhanced by the
general attitude of the leadership of the DOD services. Traditionally,
the DOD is opposed to any activity that detracts from its focus on
fighting and winning wars.
61. SCHRADER, supra note 49, at 20.
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Military use in law enforcement is a distraction that threatens the
United States' ability to project effective, overwhelming force virtually
anywhere in the world to accomplish its objectives. It reduces the
readiness of combat forces to the extent that it detracts from the armed
forces' ability to provide meaningful training and time to ensure full
combat readiness. This distraction is as real a drag on military readi-
ness as are shortages of spare parts, fuel, and equipment. We do not
have enough military personnel and equipment to be everywhere and
do everything. Since September 11, 2001, this situation has grown
even more apparent. Coast Guard cutters that would normally be un-
der way in the Caribbean in an effort to stop drug smugglers now are
hugging close to the homeland to provide port security. Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft that might be used
to detect aerial smuggling are now overseas in the air war over Af-
ghanistan. National Guard units that would have patrolled the south-
ern border are relieving active duty units in Kosovo so they in turn can
relieve Marines in Kandahar. DOD is reorganizing its joint staff and
reducing the drug detection staff from fifteen to two. The needs are
simply elsewhere.
The PCA will continue to play a role in the larger debate on
homeland security. There are those who advocate a loosening of its
strictures in light of the new environment. 62 A greater United States
military presence in Colombia to assist in protecting strategic interests
such as pipelines is under discussion. Policymakers are increasingly
noticing the link between narco-traffickers and terrorism funding.
Some are arguing that drug smuggling is a homeland security is-
sue, and military response should be part of the equation. 63 The Na-
tional Strategy for Homeland Security, released in July 2002, lists a
number of initiatives the federal government plans to take, including
the following:
Review authority for military assistance in domestic security. Fed-
eral law prohibits military personnel from enforcing the law
62. Senator Warner wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld late last year urging the
DOD take such a review. See Letter from Senator John Warner (R-Va.) to Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense (Oct. 12, 2001) (on file with the author).
63. In the fall of 2002, the United States established the Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), the first combatant command with geographic responsibility for all military
operations in North America (the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Cuba). The first com-
mander of NORTHCOM, Air Force General Bernard Ebbers, has given a number of press in-
terviews that indicate that the military's role in law enforcement within the domestic United
States should be reviewed, given the new terrorist threat that the nation faces. See U.S. Northern
Command Fact Sheets at http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.factsheets#us
northcom (last visited May 18, 2003).
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within the United States except as expressly authorized by the
Constitution or an Act of Congress. The threat of catastrophic
terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws permitting the
military to act within the United States in order to determine
whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would
benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so,
how.64
Time will tell if anything is to come of this initiative. What is
clear, however, is that the issue of the military's involvement in law
enforcement will continue to be debated, studied, and worried over.
If the military is to continue to be involved in law enforcement, a
policy review is needed. We must recognize that trying to get the
DOD services to do everything is not the answer. It would be better
to focus our time and resources on those organizations, both military
(such as the United States Coast Guard and the several states' Na-
tional Guard) and nonmilitary (traditional civilian law enforcement
agencies), that can best focus on the specialized requirements of a law
enforcement mission. We should keep the rest of the military focused
on that which it does well: projecting power and fighting wars. Fun-
damentally, we, as a nation, must think and choose wisely, using the
military in law enforcement judiciously when its capabilities can be of
most use, of greatest success, and complementary to the skills the mili-
tary needs to be effective in a modern combat environment.
64. OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY 48 (July 2002).
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